Both sides deserves blame for Middle East violence

At no time in the past decade, perhaps even longer, has the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reached the horrific level of the last week. The dramatic escalation that the world witnessed, beginning with the barbaric "Passover massacre," followed by excessive measures of the Israeli military, demands immediate and comprehensive international intervention. Right now, the situation is as close to all-out war as one can imagine, and the possibility of avoiding that outcome is shrinking by the day.

The infamous suicide bombing in the seaside resort in Netanya was the second deadliest terrorist attack in the region since the current round of violence began in 2000. Given the huge loss of life, Israel had every right to respond and to prevent such outrages from taking place in the future. Military retaliation was justified, maybe even essential, but what was completely irresponsible and utterly unnecessary is the decision to attack the headquarters of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. The assault in Ramallah was intended, quite self-evidently, as a symbolic statement that Israel would no longer accept Arafat as a partner at all, and the United States and Europe were absolutely right to speak out against it.

That Arafat and the PA as a whole have not done all they could to prevent attacks in Israel proper and the occupied territories should be clear. Arrests of militants have been dwindling in recent months, and serious action against terrorist groups and their political allies has been taken sporadically, only under strong international pressure. In this context, a limited number of Israeli incursions aimed at destroying terrorist infrastructure could well be understood. Similarly, occasional terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens would probably be inevitable even if the PA fulfilled all of its agreements to the letter. Although the PA certainly bears some responsibility for the recent escalations, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's response has also been quite unhelpful for ending the bloodshed.

By attacking the symbols of Arafat's power--prisons, radio stations, police posts and offices--Sharon effectively made it impossible for Arafat to rein in the militants. The destruction of PA infrastructure, both military and civilian, has made this logistically more difficult than it otherwise would have been. Even more importantly, this has lessened Arafat's credibility when speaking out against Palestinian extremists. How can he argue to his people that Israel wants peace when it has confined him to a single room in Ramallah and cut his phone lines? Israel's position has long been that it won't negotiate under fire, but this is effectively what it demands from Arafat. Sharon's frustration is perfectly understandable, but he has to consider the long-term ramifications of his tactics, especially the radicalization of peaceful Palestinians.

A more pragmatic, reasonable response to the Netanya attack would be for the Israeli army to join Palestinian security forces in systematically striking against the installations of those directly responsible for the bombing. If Israel decided to pursue this without seeking Palestinian cooperation, that would be less desirable but still understandable. Above all, Sharon must recognize that destroying the PA will not solve the problem of terror. As Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, Israel still needs the PA, now more than ever. As flawed as the PA's management of the crisis has been, the absence of a moderate Palestinian leadership would be even worse for Israel.

Of course, Arafat is also not without blame. The fact that an offshoot of Fatah, his own political party, is continually claiming responsibility for attacks on innocent civilians is entirely unacceptable. The limits of Arafat's power over independent militant groups are understandable, but at the very least, he must exercise comprehensive control over the factions that answer to him.

Protecting citizens against violence is the responsibility of every government, which is why the world's reaction to the Israeli retaliation focused solely on the method used, not the essence of the response itself. As Israel's closest ally, the United States should continue to apply pressure on Sharon to exercise restraint in its retaliatory strikes. At the same time, the United States needs to demand that Arafat crack down hard on militants. Without a reduction in terror, domestic outrage and political pressure in Israel will make a ceasefire a distant hope, at best.

If pleading with the leaders does not reduce the level of violence, the time may come for active international intervention. The U.N. Security Council, which offered harsh criticism of both sides in recent resolutions, could be forced to send armed peacekeepers into the region. This solution is not ideal, given Israel's fervent opposition to such a move; in fact, it is the last resort. In the end, however, broader considerations may make it inevitable. A full-scale war is to be avoided at all cost. If war does break out, it will end everything that has been achieved from the 1979 Camp David accords to the present. This nightmare scenario is not likely, but the risk cannot be ignored, if only because the consequences are so tragic.