Future friend or foe? Russiaa faces critical juncture

The recent discover that Central Intelligence Agency counter-intelligence officer Aldrich Ames was a mole for the KGB has refocused attention on the future of the United States/Russia relations. That Russia is still spying on the United States should be no surprise. Indeed, even America's allies, including Israel and France, have spied on it. The CIA still spies on Russia, as the need for good information on a host of issues from nuclear posture to political climate is required for American leaders to make decisions. Events in Russia, however, indicate that the future of American relations with Russia is in jeopardy as economic and political reforms have not fully materialized.

Russia has taken a turn for the worse. Boris Yeltsin's control of the government is slipping. Valdimir Zeus's is influencing Russia's policy-making apparatus. The Russian economy is in a terrible state, as the reformist economic team of Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov is no longer in power. The Russian parliament has granted amnesty to Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoi and the other men who conducted the 1993 coup attempt against the Yeltsin government, as well as to those involved in the 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. Zhirinovsky himself was outside of Lefortovo prison to greet Khasbulatov and Rutskoi upon their release. All of the above would very much like to see Boris Yeltsin locked up and his reforms scrapped.

The release of Rutskoi, Khasbulatov, et al raises a new and disturbing dilemma for Russian politics: Voter now have a more realistic choice for the 1996 presidential elections. Yeltsin or a designated successor of liberal bent has little chance of victory due to widespread dissatisfaction with the miserable state of the Russian economy. Zhirinovsky is a credible threat, but is viewed by some in Russia as too radical or even insane (which he may be). Rutskoi and Khasbulatov provide an alternative. They reject the economic and political reforms espoused by Gaidar, but lack the baggage of Zhirinovsky's rantings and ravings. Indeed, Zhirinovsky stated "the choice is between me and Rutskoi."

Recall that Rutskoi and Khasbulatov attempted to wrest control of the Russian government from Yeltsin last October, and were defeated only by military force. In the minds of many Russians, the two were victimized by the Yeltsin regime. They represent the sort of "take charge" attitude that attracts people to Zhirinovsky. Their capture and subsequent imprisonment put the two out of the political picture, until now. All of the above assumes a peaceful transition in 1996. There may yet be a civil war in Russia.

A Russia under Rutskoi or some similar will not pose an immediate danger to the United States and Western Europe. Tanks will not stream through the Fulda Gap; nuclear missiles will not rain down on Washington. Given the state of Russian industry, military morale and logistical problems, intelligence analysts believe that the Russians would be incapable of mounting any sort of military operation outside the borders of the former Soviet Union.

But Russian can stir up serious political problems. First, Russia will continue to intervene in former Soviet republic, notably Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan, in the name of protecting ethnic Russians or Russian security interests. Russian and Ukraine may clash over the status of the Crimea, whose residents just voted for a government which favors reunification with Russia. Moscow may see fit to supply arms to undesirables such as North Korea in an effort to raise hard currency. Russia still has a veto on the Security Council, and could hold up important resolutions, as it is now doing on the Bosnia question. Its involvement in Bosnia, while possibly beneficial, illustrates Moscow's desire to reassert itself on the world stage and may limit NATO's options.

Efforts to prevent the emergence of a more hostile Russia might not be worth the trouble, while the United States has little ability to influence Russian politics. cutting off financial aid will anger Yeltsin, but continuing it make him look like a pawn in the eyes of the hardliners. Besides, no one has enough money to bail out the Russian economy, especially when the Russian government is unwilling to back economic reform wholeheartedly. Easing up on the Serbs and refusing to admit Eastern European and Baltic states into NATO will make Yeltsin look tougher, but will also injure U.S. credibility. The United States cannot let Yeltsin's political fortunes govern its foreign policy.

United States/Russia relations are at a critical periods, not unlike the one immediately following World War II. At that time, the United States saw the possibility of cooperating with Uncle Joe Stalin's Soviet Union, both bilaterally and through the United Nations. With the end of the Cold War, the United States saw a similar possibility, but the opportunity is rapidly disappearing.