U.S. must stop at nothing to quash Iranian nuclear threat

Though Iran is a signatory of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Iranians are continuing the Shah's efforts to build a nuclear weapon. According to John Hollum, head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Iran will have a deployable weapon within the next 10 years. The timetable will be accelerated, however, if the Iranians can secure outside assistance. Reports indicate that Iran has received scientific aid and technology from sources in the former Soviet Union, China and North Korea. Thus, Iran may be able to assemble a workable nuclear weapon in four or five years. The United States needs to move fast if it is to prevent this disaster.

Iran's nuclear program serves three strategic purposes. First, it is a counter to Iraq's nuclear program and conventional military. Second, the Iranian bomb is an Islamic answer to Israel's nuclear capability. Third, a nuclear weapon would be a deterrent against U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf. Iran is particularly cognizant of the fact that the U.S. handily destroyed half of its navy in 1987.

An Iranian bomb creates several problems, however. First, nuclear capability would allow Iran to intimidate its neighbors, allowing the Iranians to dictate oil quotas at OPEC meetings, establish military bases in other countries and export Islamic fundamentalism. Second, an Iranian bomb would make U.S. efforts to contain Iran more difficult. Third, Iran might actually use the bomb against Iraq or Israel in a war situation. Finally, Iran is the state most likely to provide nuclear weapons to sub-national groups for use as an unconventionally delivered weapon of terror.

Arms control for Iran is particularly problematic. Export controls are ineffective, as North Korea and China are providing the Iranians with valuable assistance. Iran has also received help from former Soviet republics, possibly including tactical warheads purchased from Kazakhstan. Iran will not agree to limit or reverse its program without guarantees that Iraq and Israel will also do so, which is unlikely at best. The international community could impose sanctions, but China might veto in the Security Council and too many countries--i.e. Germany and Japan--rely on Iranian oil and trade to go along with a strict embargo.

The United States must enact a declaratory policy which will deter Iran from using nuclear weapons. An ideal policy would threaten retaliation in the event that the Iranians use nuclear weapons against any American interests, which, given the situation in the Middle East and the oil factor, would probably mean just about any target within Iran's striking range. The nature of the retaliation should be left vague to give the United States flexibility in deciding how to respond. While such a declaratory policy is designed to deter, Iran may not be deterrable. The Iranian government is dominated by Islamic fundamentalists, some of a messianic bent, and may not be afraid of a nuclear response if the "Great Satan" can be gravely harmed. Further, if the Iranians use unconventional means to deliver a nuclear weapon, deterrence fails if the attacker cannot be identified.

The United States also needs to develop options for coping with Iranian weapons. Systems including Patriot were designed specifically for the antiaircraft role, and have been provided to Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Missile and unconventional delivery are more problematic; shooting down an incoming ballistic missile with any degree of certainty is a difficult task. Still, the U.S. must develop a system effective against short- and medium-range missiles launched in limited numbers. Defending the U.S. and its allies from an unconventionally delivered bomb may be impossible given the inability of most countries to control their borders.

It may be that Iran cannot be deterred from using a nuclear weapon, transferring weapons to third parties or refraining from conventional conflict which may escalate to the nuclear level. These dangers cannot be sufficiently contained by diplomatic countermeasures. Thus, military action is conceivable if the United States acts before Iran has a workable bomb. The longer Iran's nuclear program is allowed to fester, the lower the certainty that Iran does not have a bomb with which to retaliate. Further, a more mature nuclear program has a larger number of components that would need to be targeted to shut down the operation.

Diplomatic efforts and sanctions will not be able to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. More forceful options will be required. Before resorting to military rollback, the United States should enact a special-operations plan which would entail intercepting key technology exports destined for the Iranian program, kidnapping or assassinating scientists and engineers involved in the project, and substituting sabotaged equipment in intercepted export shipments. A special-operations plan, however, will more likely slow, rather than stop the Iranian program. The United States will be left with two options: Either live with an Iranian bomb by issuing a stern declaratory policy and developing a ballistic-missile defense system, or conduct a military strike to destroy Iran's program before it reaches the point of weaponization.