The nuclear deal with Iran fails in its central mission: it does not mitigate the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. At best, the deal simply delays Iran; at worst, the deal will help to shield Iran from scrutiny while it develops a bomb. It is clear that allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons would undoubtedly endanger the Middle East and the rest of the world. A nuclear Iran would cause a nuclear arms race in one of the most unstable regions on earth.
Iran currently has three pathways to acquiring a nuclear bomb. The country can ignore the international community and allow sanctions to harm its economy while pursuing a nuclear bomb. The terrorist state can go ahead with the proposed deal, gaining an immediate $150 billion in sanctions relief which is almost half of Iran’s annual GDP, and then simply not comply in the coming years with the stipulations of the agreement. Or, alternatively, Iran can comply with the deal and develop nuclear weapons after the 15 year lifetime of the deal. Herein lies the major problem with the deal: this deal does not secure the security of the Middle East, the United States and the world from Iran’s regional ambitions.
For some time now, we have been hearing that a bad deal with Iran is worse than no deal. Well, the proposed deal with Iran is unequivocally a bad deal. While the deal is supposedly based on verification, the simple truth is that Iran cannot be trusted. As a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has promised not to develop nuclear weapons nor use nuclear technology for military purposes. However, Iran has lied consistently for the past 30 years. Seven of the eight major nuclear sites in Iran were started secretly, in direct violation of the NPT. Seven out of eight.
But what if Iran abides by the rules? What then? Well, after complying with the deal and waiting just 15 short years until the deal expires, Iran can acquire nuclear weapons with an “almost down to zero” breakout time. This is what is known as the “patient pathway to the bomb.”
Consider this: under the current nuclear agreement, Iran will be allowed to test advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges in eight-and-a-half years. Such models are capable of enriching uranium up to 20 times faster than Iran’s current IR-1 model. Iran’s current breakout capability is rated at between three and seven months. Using advanced centrifuges, Iran’s breakdown time would shrink down to between five and 11 days. With only a one to two week window, the international community would be hard pressed to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
In five years, Iran would be allowed to purchase tanks, helicopters, aircraft, heavy artillery and a barrage of other weaponry after the U.N arms embargo on conventional weapons is lifted. Such an increase in military power would surely cause an arms race with other Middle Eastern countries. By waiting out the storm, Iran gains what it wanted all along.
In eight years, Iran can legally expand its ballistic missile program including its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program under the disguise of satellite testing. Using advanced ICBM’s will allow Iran to hit targets almost anywhere in the world. Furthermore, Iran is not required to dismantle any of its centrifuges and is allowed to maintain all of its nuclear facilities under the proposed deal. Under the best-case scenario, Iran can become a nuclear threshold state in 15 years with the military capability to dominate the region.
Finally, rather than providing economic relief as Iran shows compliance, this deal provides the fuel for Iran to carry out its nuclear weapons ambition by providing the terrorist state with an almost immediate $150 billion in unfrozen assets ? the proportional equivalent of $7 trillion flowing into the U.S economy. In addition, Iran will gain foreign investment and renewed oil sales. Such immediate lifting of sanctions would empower the Iranian economy and strengthen the Iranian military, therefore providing little incentive for Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons when the proposed deal expires in 15 years.
By complying with the proposed deal, Iran can legitimize its nuclear program, enrich weapons-grade uranium and plutonium when the proposed deal expires in 15 years, achieve a breakout time in a matter of days and develop ICBM’s strapped with nuclear warheads which can strike targets almost anywhere on the globe within 30 minutes. Indeed, the proposed nuclear agreement does not block Iran’s way to the bomb because by complying with the deal, Iran can still acquire nuclear weapons almost immediately after the deal expires; the proposed deal therefore paves the way to the bomb. Thus, I ask you to join me in opposing this deal.
Albert Antar is a Trinity sophomore. His column is part one in a five-part series on the Iranian nuclear deal. The columnists for the five-part series are Antar, Eidan Jacob, Max Schreiber, Pi Praveen, and Edward Torgas.
Note: This column has been updated in accordance with the wishes of the author.
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