Within the near future, maybe even this year, Saudi Arabia will probably demand a conclusion to the decade-old U.S. military presence on its soil. Rumors to this effect have already been spreading, and even if they are unsubstantiated--as the Saudi crown prince claimed in a recent interview--the White House will eventually have this very dilemma on its hands. However, the issue should not be whether the American military can afford to withdraw; rather, it is whether the United States would ever agree to come back.
In purely tactical terms, the end of America's deployment should hardly be considered a setback. The loss of the Prince Sultan base would deprive the Air Force of a refueling station as it patrols Iraq's no-fly zones, but that's about as far as the damage would go. Continued presence in other Middle Eastern allies, such as Turkey, as well as greater use of aircraft carriers, means that our ability to respond to a regional crisis would scarcely diminish. Withdrawal presents no threat at all to U.S. interests.
The House of Saud has always had a fairly peculiar relationship with Washington; in essence, it remains an oil-for-arms barter arrangement. They guarantee us a steady supply of cheap oil, and in return, we provide them with top-of-the-line armaments, chiefly so they can defend their own oilfields from pesky neighbors like Saddam Hussein. Saudi royalty get to stay in power and the U.S. economy gets low inflation. Everybody wins, right? Well, not quite.
What this commercial marriage of convenience conceals is a fundamentally mistrustful and divisive relationship between the two countries. Economically, everything is still business as usual. Politically, though, the strategic interests of these two nations are at odds with one another. They are not quite mutually exclusive, but they are very, very different.
Saudi Arabia has unquestionably one of the most repressive governments in the world. Its lack of respect for human rights is so blatant that Freedom House gave it the lowest possible "state of freedom" rating for the last nine years. This, by the way, is as bad or even worse than any member of President George W. Bush's "axis of evil." Of course, it is not for the United States to dictate how the Saudi regime will run domestic affairs, but it should consider these factors when deciding whether to spend U.S. tax dollars and risk U.S. lives in defense of this regime.
Beyond human rights, the Saudi government has proven a mediocre participant, at best, in the war on terrorism. It is true that it would like to see al-Qaeda destroyed, not least because Osama bin Laden has long been a vocal opponent of the Saudi monarchy. On this point, our interests do coincide. However, although it has been critical of al-Qaeda, the Saudi regime gives millions of dollars to other highly questionable organizations, the rhetoric of which has often been virulently anti-American.
Internal political repression in a large number of Arab countries is widely seen as one of the principal reasons for the development of extremist Islamic groups. Because no parties could ever openly express anti-government sentiment in Saudi Arabia, they were forced to go underground, and in the process, their ideology has become even more jingoistic and intolerant. By supporting the associated entities of such groups--often under the guise of religious charities--and by deflecting their anti-monarchist rhetoric to anti-Western subject matter, the Saudi regime has bought itself temporary respite. But it is sitting on a powder keg, and as long as its short-term instinct of self-preservation keeps it from clamping down on fanatics, this strategy will prove to be lethal in the long run.
None of this means that the United States should drop all its support for the Saudi government. As imperfect as it is, the alternative is even worse. The Saudis have provided some support for anti-Taliban operations, a fact that should not be ignored. Furthermore, they are still the world's biggest oil producer, and it is in America's interest to have them as the leader of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
I am not calling for a complete re-examination of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. What I am suggesting is that our support--particularly in the area of defense--for the House of Saud should be tempered by other considerations. For one, we need to encourage it to follow the example of Jordan and Kuwait, the governments of which successfully overcame internal opposition to greater openness and civil liberties. Future arms sales should be conditional upon internal democratization, or at least modest political reform.
Withdrawal might appease those in Saudi Arabia who claim that an American presence there is an abomination, but it will ultimately reduce America's ability to come to the kingdom's aid. Although it is unwise to limit our future options, I would argue that we should equally reduce our resolve to do so, as long as the Saudi government refuses to even acknowledge the need for change from within.
Pavel Molchanov is a Trinity junior.
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