On Monday, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, head of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, earned himself a spot in the history books. McChrystal’s report on the war in Afghanistan, sent to President Obama Aug. 30, can now be read on the Washington Post’s Web site.
The 66-page report signals a potential paradigm shift in U.S. military strategy. McChrystal describes the dire need to implement a better counter insurgency plan in Afghanistan and to station more U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.
“The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive,” McChrystal writes. “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months)—while Afghan security capacity matures—risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”
The situation is critical. Counter insurgency and the obstacles to Afghani stability take up the majority of McChrystal’s report. A non-traditional war calls for non-traditional warfare, and this revolution must start with the soldier. McChrystal criticizes current forces in Afghanistan for being too ignorant of Afghani culture. He envisions troops trained not only to protect, but to help build functioning societies.
Destruction of the enemy is no longer the primary goal; protection of the civilian population is. The days of calling in bombers to take out enemy targets in civilian population centers must end. Even if Osama bin Laden himself is killed in an attack near a civilian gathering, the psychological and social costs of accidentally killing a bride, groom and half their families far outweighs the benefits from accomplishing traditional military objectives.
For example, insurgents normally have two choices when confronting U.S. forces: be killed or surrender. McChrystal wants to give them a third option: reintegration into the local community. In the battle for the hearts and minds of Afghanis, McChrystal recognizes that the U.S. must offer better results than those offered by Taliban insurgents. Security, economic opportunity, education—McChrystal’s military must account for it all. In short, the U.S. military must become nation builders in order to succeed in Afghanistan.
Brig. Gen. H.R. McMaster faced a crowd of students, faculty and guests at Duke Monday night, after McChrystal’s report had been released. Fully grasping his responsibilities as an officer in the U.S. military, McMaster warned the crowd that he would not comment on policy, but that he could discuss background information on the situation the military faces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. McMaster, while significantly less critical than McChrystal concerning U.S. troop preparedness in the region, touched on the same issues found in McChrystal’s report. Establishing security is necessary in Afghanistan, but the security must be established with the needs and interests of the population in mind. McMaster and McChrystal are on the same page, perhaps signaling the already changed mindset of U.S. military commanders.
But military officials still await President Barack Obama’s plan for Afghanistan. John Hillen, Trinity ’88 and former assistant secretary of state for political military affairs, spoke at Duke last week, and attributed some of the failure in Afghanistan to Obama’s delay in speaking to the public about Afghanistan’s importance. Perhaps rightfully so—it’s the president’s job to explain the case to the American people, and rally support when he or she believes the fight is in the best interests of this country.
But the president isn’t the only one to blame. The media has failed to depict the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Cynics may say the U.S. is to blame for Afghanistan’s suffering, but Kabul wasn’t so rosy when the Taliban was in power. Even in Taliban-controlled sections of Afghanistan today, beheadings, torture and other forms of violence are used by leaders to maintain authority through fear. McMaster pointed to a PBS Frontline documentary, “Children of the Taliban,” that he said accurately portrays insurgent brutality found in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in McChrystal’s report. McChrystal and McMaster connect these acts of violence to increased regional instability—insurgent forces kill local leadership, replace the leaders with their own members and then target adolescents and children for indoctrination.
The problems facing the U.S. are threefold: 1) The failure to effectively market the campaign has resulted in less than optimal support, both in Afghanistan and at home; 2) the modern soldier needs to be retrained as a nation builder, armed not only with guns but with cultural understanding, linguistic skills and compassion; 3) the insufficient troop level threatens to compromise the entire mission in Afghawwnistan. McChrystal’s military would address many of the problems our soldiers face in Afghanistan today, and, if successfully implemented, McChrystal’s recommendations may prove to be the decisive turning point in American Middle Eastern strategy.
But Obama has yet to act decisively. This is no time to waver, because every day the Commander-in -Chief waits, another U.S. soldier or Afghani child inches closer to the grave.
Elad Gross is a Trinity senior. His column runs every Wednesday.
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