Commentary: Let's make a deal

Let's forget for a moment the rhetoric coming from North Korea. All that talk about belligerent American imperialism and thinly veiled threats to turn its southern neighbor into a radioactive wasteland are not very helpful for constructive diplomacy, but they are also irrelevant. In the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - which is, incidentally, neither democratic nor a republic - only deeds matter, not words. What the DPRK has been doing since last fall is illegal and inappropriate, but the United States can offer a straightforward solution to the ongoing nuclear standoff. All Washington needs to do now is, quite simply, offer Pyongyang a bribe.

Some will label this appeasement. Some will call it negotiating under duress. And some will point out that Kim Jong-Il and his cronies have proven themselves untrustworthy. Of these arguments, the third is the most pertinent. There is no denying that the DPRK violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, abrogated the 1994 Agreed Framework accord with the United States and defied the will of U.N. nuclear inspectors. When Iraq committed only one of these offenses, it was threatened with "serious consequences" by Washington and the Security Council. The Bush administration has therefore been accused of a double standard for threatening war on Iraq but not the DPRK when both are blatantly in breach of international law. But in fact, the administration has rightly recognized that whereas Baghdad responds only to a stick, Pyongyang can be controlled by means of a carrot. It worked for eight years after 1994, and if the United States offers the right carrot this time, North Korea will be off the geopolitical radar screen for the foreseeable future.

Unlike Saddam, Kim has no serious aspirations to regional hegemony. Stuck between Asia's most powerful country and one of America's closest allies, even he knows that this would not be a feasible objective. Like any dictator, Kim wants to remain in power, for which he needs the help of the world's fourth biggest military. The problem is that a chronically mismanaged economy has led to certain, shall we say, budgetary constraints for the DPRK defense establishment. In what bears some resemblance to the "more bang for the buck" theory of Eisenhower, current DPRK policy requires a nuclear deterrent to offset a degraded ability to wage conventional war. The key point here is that the only real purpose of such an arsenal would be to prevent a U.S. invasion. It's not that the United States would want to invade in the first place, but Kim's paranoia demands this extra bit of insurance.

Of course, Washington is never excited about new members forcing their way into the exclusive nuclear club, particularly those that spout the rhetoric of Marx as their only justification for staying in power. In the case of the DPRK, there is the additional risk of a nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the close proximity of North Korean ballistic missiles to Japan and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Keeping the DPRK's nuclear arms program from coming to fruition, therefore, is a sensible goal of this administration, much like the last one. President George W. Bush's only miscalculation in handling this matter is his refusal to offer tangible concessions to Pyongyang.

What might those concessions be? First of all, no one is seriously contemplating a U.S.-withdrawal from South Korea, not even Kim. A non-aggression pact would be a good start, along with a resumption of fuel oil shipments to bolster the DPRK's energy-starved economy. These measures are neither expensive nor dangerous for U.S. interests in East Asia. On the other hand, they represent a show of good faith and- here goes Kim's paranoia again - reassure the Communist regime that it has nothing to fear from the United States, as long as it behaves itself.

I'm not suggesting that we build our foreign policy around mollifying fears of the world's tyrants, but if Kim really wants a peace treaty, he can have it. The administration has already declared its intention to deal with this matter peacefully, so a formal pact would be entirely consistent with current policy. The idea of signing another solemn agreement with a man who has broken the last one may seem distasteful, but it is far preferable to the alternative of continued nuclear tensions - or worse - in Korea. Such a peace treaty would also facilitate a final settlement of the Korean War, something our allies in the region have sought for decades. Both Tokyo and the new government in Seoul want nothing more than a quiet end to this whole affair - the quintessential Nixonian "peace with honor."

For Kim, such an outcome would also be a win-win proposition. He can avoid the expense of building and maintaining an arsenal of nukes while winning invaluable propaganda points for respecting the will of the United Nations. The latter will be a necessity if he expects financial aid from his wealthy neighbors to rebuild his country's decrepit infrastructure.

The Bush administration has already announced that it is willing to enter into a dialogue with the DPRK on the nuclear issue. All it needs to do now is take the next step and declare that it would be amenable to some negotiated accommodation. There is much that Washington can offer Pyongyang, but it would also get something that is just as valuable in return. Talk, after all, is cheap. A major war on the Korean peninsula, on the other hand, would not be. Quite simply, pragmatism dictates that offering a small carrot is sometimes more effective than waving a big stick. In this case, there is certainly no shame in compromise.