“How can we put an end to the war in Syria?”
It’s been five years since I first attempted to answer this crucial, yet nearly impossible question. It seemed the model of the war in Syria was so complex that it would be impossible for the human mind to fully grasp it, that only a succession of random events could put an end to a savagery that in February 2016 had already killed or injured 11.5 percent of the population and displaced almost half of it.
However, I quickly found out that randomness is not going to bring peace back to Syria anytime soon. In fact, political scientists believe that the equilibrium of the model of the Syrian war is the continuation of war for a long period of time. In other words, if the actors of the conflict do not come to the table and find a compromise that would end the war, then we are all set for another decade of fighting.
The goal of my column is therefore to use my knowledge and background to advance some ideas that could contribute to the reasoning behind a peace agreement in Syria. Being from Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, I was directly affected by the war in Syria. I became the indirect witness of the bombings, fights and political deadlocks that occurred in Lebanon as a consequence of the war in Syria, as well as witness to a refugee crisis that has led to Syrian refugees representing a quarter of the population of Lebanon, threatening the resources, identity and stability of my country.
In order to bring peace back to Syria, we need to find a compromise built around the biggest common denominators between the interests of all the major parties, a common denominator that would be big enough to incentivize actors to agree on a peace settlement.
I believe that the best political regime for a post-war Syria would be a federal republic based on power-sharing mechanisms between the different religious sects. These power-sharing mechanisms would depend on the demographic weight of each religious community, similar to the power-sharing regime in Lebanon, also called “confessionalism.” Although this regime is extremely flawed, because it is not committed to the public good and is rife with corruption and political tension, it can at least provide a platform for compromise between the conflicting religion groups in Syria and therefore close out the war.
However, the “confessional” system itself is a necessary but insufficient condition for the return of peace in Syria. Iraq adopted this regime after the 2003 U.S. invasion, but in no way has this system prevented the country from sinking into a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which in turn has allowed the Islamic State to take control of large territories of the country in 2014. The “confessional” power-sharing characteristic of the post-war Syrian regime must be accompanied by two other features: federalism and decentralization, as well as the neutrality of the new regime in regards to conflicts in the Middle-East—in particular between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
I believe that such a system, sponsored by the international community, could be satisfactory enough for major domestic actors to end the fighting and its consequences—death, destruction and devastation, both political and societal. Such a regime would contend the Sunnis, who oppose the Assad regime; being an authoritarian regime dominated by the Alawite minority—10 to 15 percent of the population—it does not represent them. In fact, making up the bulk of the population, they would have the potential to take control of the country. Power-sharing would allow religious minorities such as Shiites, Druze and Christians to preserve some of their political, economic and cultural influence in Syria. Federalism would allow Alawites, Druzes and Kurds, who are largely concentrated in some specific regions, to obtain autonomous regions where they can govern themselves.
In addition, decentralization would allow smaller and less concentrated communities, such the Christian Syriacs, to adopt the bylaws and policies that they are most comfortable with in their villages, towns or regions. Thanks to federalism and decentralization, the survival of minority communities would be ensured, as they will be allowed to practice their faith without facing the discriminatory laws advocated for by many Islamic fundamentalist rebels. The ability of minorities to live with dignity and freedom on their ancestral lands would remove much of Assad’s legitimacy, who displays himself as the protector of minorities.
But none of this could happen if major international actors, in particular Russia and the United States, do not strongly endorse such a regime. I believe these two great powers should oversee the functioning of the new regime, Russia being the representative of the minorities and the U.S. being the representative of the Sunni majority.
Yet, the tensions and lack of trust between Saudi Arabia and Iran are so great that they will have to commit not to interfere in Syria’s affairs if they are ever willing to bring about peace. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. could easily agree to such a deal. By replacing the current Baath regime by a Sunni-dominated regime, they would weaken the alliance between Iran, the current Baath regime and Lebanese Hezbollah that has been threatening both U.S. and Saudi interests the region. However, for Russia and Iran the new system is much less acceptable, unless they get something in return. Russia could maintain its military bases in the Alawite autonomous region, while co-overseeing the new regime in Syria. Iran could obtain a recognition of its preponderant role in representing the Shiites throughout the Middle-East. In addition, the West could better integrate Iran into the world economy.
And then there’s Turkey and the Kurds. Turkey would be satisfied by this new deal because it gives the Sunnis control of Syria. In addition, the Syrian Kurds are allies of the Kurdish rebel group PKK in Turkey; but if the Syrian Kurds effectively cut their ties to the Turkish PKK, then the government of Turkey, encouraged by Russia and the U.S., would agree to let the Syrian Kurds have their own autonomous regions.
Turkey has always had good relationships with and strong economic ties to the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region because their relationship was based on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. So why can’t Turkey tolerate the existence of (and even have good relationships with) a Kurdish autonomous region in Syria as well?
This comprehensive deal would of course mean that Assad, abandoned by his most important allies, would be forced to step down. The Baath regime will have to fall, but the whole security apparatus shouldn’t be dismantled immediately, as it did with Iraq, with heavy consequences in terms of alienation of Iraqi Sunnis and internal chaos. Instead, a government of transition made of all religious groups (with the Alawites being temporarily overrepresented) should be formed to oversee the reshuffling of the Syrian army, the disarmament of all militias involved in the war (Syrian Shiite and Alawite militias included) and the destruction of all terrorist groups still opposing the peace.
Emile Riachi is a Trinity sophomore. His column, "a political night vision," runs on alternate Thursdays.
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