The future of U.S.-China relations

The relationship between the United States and China has always been tenuous at best. Like members of a class project group forced to interact with one another against their will, China and the United States find themselves forced to cooperate. Since his inauguration in 2009, President Obama has attempted to develop a new strategic outlook toward the emerging superpower—one that engages them and incorporates them into the international system through the US strategic lens. To date, his strategy has been marginally effective and offers his successor a solid foundation off of which they will (hopefully) build a new and effective strategic partnership.

During the past decade, China began a new era of military investment, as any rising superpower could reasonably require. Perhaps more noteworthy than sheer investment is their development of weapons specifically designed to prevent foreign military activity in the region. Most notable among these technologies is the missile designed specifically to penetrate the hulls of aircraft carriers. The Chinese claim these weapons serve as defensive preparations only, but in reality they create the potential for a more volatile international system. Without a variety of military technology, conventional and otherwise, a state cannot signal its preferences effectively. Fewer technologies reduce the potential to fire a proverbial shot across the bow and instead encourage a direct jump to use of dramatic technology.

In recent years China added to its developing military strategy by playing a more active and aggressive role in its region of the world, specifically the South China Sea. China recently finished a campaign in which they literally dumped sand into the ocean to produce man-made islands. The Chinese use these islands to claim legal protection via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arguing that they justify granting China territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone in the area surrounding the islands. These claims overlap with those of surrounding nations like Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. Most disconcerting are the military instillations appearing on these islands. Several have deep-water harbors that could support Chinese naval vessels, and a few even have airstrips. Although the Chinese claim these islands serve merely economic and defensive purposes, their potential for inciting conflict remains obvious. In recent months, Chinese and American naval warships came very close to one another and exchanged radio messages. Although the situation remains relatively peaceful, the potential exists for escalation in the future.

In response to this expanding Chinese power, the Obama administration introduced its strategy called the “Pivot to Asia.” Ignoring the semantics, which have caused the administration considerable headache, the strategy proposes engaging with China more and seeing more of the world through a China-inclusive lens. As then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in the strategy’s inaugural article in 2011, “at a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential.” She also notes that the United States had repeatedly found itself shackled to the interminable conflict in the Middle East and could no longer afford to do so due to China becoming an increasingly prominent figure. Of course, since the publication of that article the administration has found itself wrestling with the Arab spring, intervention in Libya, the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS, but they nonetheless remained committed to making China a key component of U.S. foreign policy.

If the “rebalance to Asia” (as the “pivot” was eventually renamed) was the strategy’s bumper sticker title, the Trans Pacific Partnership was its keystone. Billed as a trade agreement between the nations surrounding the Pacific Ocean, it serves to redefine the rules of international, economic and diplomatic engagement with the countries surrounding China. The partnership accomplishes two primary objectives with regard to a grand strategy. First, it forces the nations in China’s region to uphold trade and labor practices that China traditionally eschews. By doing so it, in theory, forces China to adopt similar practices in the long term. If one takes a pessimistic view of the agreement, it could be framed as a way to thwart China’s economic development by raising the cost of manufacturing in the country. Even a more optimistic view of the agreement sees the benefits of encouraging the surrounding nations to adopt a more Western-friendly economic environment. Second, the TPP further solidifies the relationships that the U.S. shares with the signatory states. By doing so, it not only prevents China from dominating those countries (diplomatically and otherwise), but it also strengthens American relationships. Should the situation become more polarized in the future, the U.S. would (theoretically) be in a better position down the road.

Five years beyond the strategy’s introduction and less than a year from President Obama’s departure from office, foreign policy analysts and laymen alike have begun considering whether the strategy proved effective, and how it will shape policy for the next administration. Few deny that the strategy found itself distracted by events in the Middle East. Ultimately, Obama’s effort to turn the country’s attention toward China proved less effective than he hoped, but it may provide a solid foundation off of which the next administration can build a stronger strategy. If I found myself in a position to advise the next President on Chinese policy, I would recommend continuing to bring China into the internal system, rather than excluding them altogether. The Chinese have the potential to shoulder a share of the world’s responsibility, and by doing so continue their expansion peacefully. In turn, the United States ought to balance the fine line between antagonizing China and allowing them to surpass us. Although that will prove a very difficult strategy, modern society as we know it could not survive the alternative—armed conflict between the United States and China.

Brian Hopkins is a Trinity senior. This is his final column for The Chronicle.